ABSTRACT: Prior research finds that firms warning investors of an earnings shortfall experience lower returns than non-warning firms with similar risks and earnings news. Openness thus appears to be penalized by investors. Yet, this finding may be due to a self-selection bias that occurs when firms with a larger amount of unfavorable non-earnings news (''other bad news'') are more likely to warn. In this paper I use a Heckman selection model to infer the amount of other bad news and document that, on average, warning firms have a larger amount of other bad news than non-warning firms. After controlling for this effect, I find that warning firms' returns remain lower than those of non-warning firms in a short-term window ending five days after earnings announcement. When this window is extended by three months, however, warning and non-warning firms exhibit similar returns. My evidence suggests that openness is ultimately not penalized by investors.
I. INTRODUCTION
T his paper examines whether firms that warn of an earnings shortfall experience lower stock returns than firms that have similar risks, earnings news, and non-earnings news but do not warn. After controlling for risks and earnings news, Kasznik and Lev (1995; hereafter, KL) find that warning firms' returns are significantly lower than the returns of those that likely anticipate an earnings shortfall but do not warn (''non-warning firms''). This finding has been interpreted as a market penalty for openness.
1 If investors indeed penalize openness, then firms that face an earnings shortfall would be less willing to warn and, as a result, the frequency of warnings should diminish. Surprisingly, the number of warnings increased in the past decade (see Figure 1) .
In this paper I examine whether KL's finding is due to unfavorable non-earnings news, referred to as ''other bad news,'' that affects managers' warning decisions and investors'
The Accounting Review, July 2007 suggesting that warning firms are correctly priced relative to non-warning firms-there is no between-group mispricing. 3 The above negative between-group return difference, however, is not evidence of a market penalty for warning. It may be that managers are more likely to warn when they have a larger amount of other bad news, all else being equal. That is, firms self-select into the warning or non-warning groups depending on the amount of other bad news. If this is the case, then the average return of warning firms should be lower than that of non-warning firms, ceteris paribus. After removing this ''self-selection effect,'' any remaining betweengroup return difference is the ''warning effect.'' In other words, the between-group return difference consists of a self-selection effect and a warning effect. The warning effect is the difference between warning firms' returns and what the returns would have been had these firms not warned. Intuitively speaking, the warning effect estimates the average return difference between warning and non-warning firms after controlling for risks, earnings news, and other bad news. It is the warning effect, rather than the between-group return difference, that measures the market penalty for warning.
In my second step I add the control for other bad news. I find that the warning effect in the short-term window is significantly negative at Ϫ6.4 percent, but disappears in the long-term window. Subtracting the warning effect from the between-group return difference, I estimate the self-selection effect to be Ϫ3.7 percent in the short-term and about Ϫ10 percent in the long-term. The negative self-selection effect suggests that, on average, warning firms have a larger amount of other bad news than non-warning firms. Taken together, my results indicate that the negative between-group return difference in the short-term is due to both a negative warning effect and a negative self-selection effect, but the difference in the long-term is due purely to the self-selection effect. Therefore, the decision to warn is ultimately not penalized by investors.
Further, I investigate why a warning penalty exists in the short-term window. My evidence suggests that investors initially do not fully adjust stock prices for other bad news. By the end of the short-term window, investors (who typically have a larger information set than researchers) may observe other bad news or they could infer such news using the following logic. Suppose the amount of bad news is all that matters when managers decide whether to warn and-because of litigation costs from withholding bad news-a firm is more likely to warn if it has a larger amount of total bad news. If a firm warned even though its earnings shortfall is small, then the firm is likely to have a larger amount of other bad news than a warning firm that has a large earnings shortfall. Likewise, if a firm did not warn despite its large earnings shortfall, the firm is more likely to have a larger amount of other good news (or a smaller amount of other bad news) than a non-warning firm that has a small earnings shortfall. Hence, investors could infer the amount of other bad news about each firm and should adjust the stock price for such news.
In the short-term I find that while investors react more negatively to warning firms with more other bad news than to warning firms with less other bad news, they do not completely adjust for the difference in such news. For non-warning firms, on the other hand, investors initially increase, rather than decrease, the stock prices of those that have more other bad news relative to those that have less, and these price adjustments are later reversed. Thus, in the short-term investors' responses to other bad news are incomplete within the warning group and directionally incorrect within the non-warning group. I refer to this phenomenon as ''within-group mispricing. '' 4 As a result, firms with a large amount of other bad news, which therefore tend to warn, are worse off in the short-term for having warned than for being silent.
My paper makes four contributions to the literature. First, the evidence that openness is ultimately not penalized is relevant to firm managers. Managers routinely face the decision of being open versus being silent about forthcoming earnings shortfalls and are concerned about investors' responses to their disclosure decisions. My study adds to the literature beyond Shu (2003) and Xu (2003) who address a similar research issue. Shu (2003) controls for self-selection in the short-term but does not examine the long-term. Xu (2003) examines the long-term but does not control for self-selection. In addition, my study uses a substantially larger sample in the recent time period, thereby increasing statistical power and providing more current evidence than either Shu (2003) or Xu (2003) .
Second, I document within-group mispricing; such evidence is unique in the literature. Accounting and finance studies offer much evidence for market overreaction or underreaction to firms that go through particular corporate events. For example, earnings announcements (Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990) , dividend initiations and omissions (Michaely et al. 1995) , IPOs (Loughran and Ritter 1995, 2000) , tender offers (Ikenberry et al. 1995) , and stock splits (Ikenberry and Ramnath 2002) . These studies document mispricing of the event firms relative to other firms, suggesting between-group mispricing. In contrast, what I find in this study is within-group mispricing. 5 The third contribution is in my application of Heckman selection models. While previous studies have used selection models, 6 my application is new in two ways. Foremost, I decompose the between-group return difference into a warning effect and a self-selection effect. This decomposition is fundamental in studies that address self-selection. My study is the first of which I am aware that uses this relation explicitly to design empirical tests. Furthermore, I draw inferences about stock price adjustments for other bad news from the coefficients on the inverse Mills ratio (which is used to control for self-selection), and examine these coefficients across various windows, whereas previous studies largely stop short of interpreting these coefficients. My application also goes beyond the commonly used treatment-effect regression (Greene 2003) by allowing the warning and non-warning groups to have different coefficients on the inverse Mills ratio. Overall, the method that I employ can potentially be used to address other accounting issues.
Finally, my study serves as an example of how a failure to control for self-selection can lead to drastically different conclusions. Maddala (1991, 799 and 801) pointed out that the accounting studies that use selection models ''thus far do not show any strong evidence of selection bias'' because the conclusion with the control for self-selection is the same as the conclusion without such a control; therefore, ''by definition, there is no selection bias.'' His criticism remains applicable to the subsequently published accounting studies (of which I am aware) that use selection models. My study shows that without control for selfselection, one would conclude that openness is penalized, when in fact it is not. 4 I thank an anonymous referee for this insight. A trading strategy that exploits within-group mispricing earns a mean abnormal return of 2.3 percent from the warning group and 2.0 percent from the non-warning group in the three months after the event quarter. Such abnormal returns, however, may not be inconsistent with market efficiency when transaction costs are considered (Korajczyk and Sadka 2004) . 5 The total between-group return difference does not change over time, but its two components shuffle from the short-to long-term. When within-group mispricing occurs, warning or non-warning firms' coefficients on the inverse Mills ratio change from the short-to long-term, causing the self-selection effect to change over time. 6 See, e.g., Shehata (1991) , Hogan (1997) , Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) , Beatty et al. (2002) , Weber and Willenborg (2003) , and Khurana and Raman (2004) .
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews prior research. Sections III through VII present the econometric model, empirical predictions, variable identifications and measurements, data, and test results. Section VIII concludes.
II. PRIOR RESEARCH
The most popular reason for voluntary bad-news disclosure is to reduce expected settlement costs in class action lawsuits associated with price declines (Skinner 1994 (Skinner , 1997 . KL find evidence that is consistent with this argument. Using 219 warning events about large earnings surprises, they find that in the face of bad news a firm's characteristics suggesting higher litigation risk or costs are positively associated with the likelihood of warning. Other studies report mixed evidence on this argument. For example, Soffer et al. (2000) , Baginski et al. (2002), and Field et al. (2005) provide supportive evidence, whereas Francis et al. (1994) and Johnson et al. (2001) do not.
The second reason for voluntary bad-news disclosure is to maintain a strong reputation with analysts and fund managers (Skinner 1994) . This argument implicitly views a firm's disclosure decision as a mid-game phenomenon in a multi-period game. Following this conjecture, I expect that firms with many voluntary disclosures in the past are more likely to warn in the current quarter to maintain a reputation for transparency. Similarly, firms with higher analyst following have a higher propensity for issuing warnings because the damage caused by being silent would be greater.
Several studies have examined the capital-market consequences of warnings. KL find that warning firms experience larger price declines than non-warning firms in the window that covers both the warning and the subsequent earnings announcement. This finding is confirmed by Atiase et al. (2006) in a large sample that has small earnings shortfalls. KL tentatively attribute their finding to the possibility that warnings signal a permanent earnings decline and also propose market overreaction as an alternative explanation.
Two subsequent studies examine a research question similar to mine. Shu (2003) uses 104 warning firms that have large earnings shortfalls in the 1994-1995 quarters. She finds that warning firms' short-term returns are weakly significantly lower than those of nonwarning firms, but the warning effect is positive after she controls for firms' self-selection. Xu (2003) collects 151 warnings about large earnings shortfalls during 1991-1994. She finds that warning firms have larger downward analyst revisions and lower operating income than non-warning firms in the year after the event quarter, supporting KL's permanentearnings-decline argument. In the short-term return test, she finds that warning firms have weakly significantly lower returns than non-warning firms after controlling for selfselection. Moreover, she reports that warning firms earn lower excess returns than nonwarning firms over a size-M/B-momentum return benchmark in the 12 to 36 months after the event-quarter, concluding that investors have, in fact, under-reacted to warnings.
These studies do not provide a clear answer to my research question. In the short-term window, Shu (2003) and Xu (2003) report contradictory findings. In the long-term window, Xu (2003) does not control for self-selection and the drift she documents is intriguing. It is thus unclear whether a firm is worse off in the long run for issuing a warning, given its risks, earnings news, and non-earnings news known to the manager at the disclosure decision.
III. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
To determine whether the decision to warn is penalized by investors, I use a Heckman model (Heckman 1979 (Heckman , 2001 to control for the effect of firms' self-selection. 
Heckman Model
I model investors' decisions and managers' warning choices in the following system:
A firm has two possible states: warning or non-warning. Equations (1) and (2) model stock returns (R) in the warning state and non-warning state for the whole population, respectively. X is the row vector of control variables that include risk factors and earnings news (␤ is the column vector of coefficients), implying that v 1 and v 0 represent non-earnings news to investors but are unobservable to researchers. The warning effect is ␣ 1 Ϫ ␣ 0 . In reality, only warning firms are observed for estimating Equation (1) and only non-warning firms are observed for estimating Equation (2), presenting a challenge in estimating the warning effect. Equation (3) is the warning model. Warn* is a continuous latent variable known to a manager but not to researchers, for example, a measure of the pressure that the manager feels about issuing a warning. If the measure is higher than a threshold (normalized to 0 in the model), then the manager issues a warning and the binary variable Warn is 1. Otherwise, the manager keeps silent and Warn is 0. What researchers observe is merely Warnwhether a firm warns. Assuming that Z is the row vector of all the factors that affect a manager's warning decision and are observable to researchers, such as the earnings shortfall, ε then represents the factors that affect the manager's decision but are unobservable to researchers.
Unlike in a standard regression, in Equation (3) after ␥ is estimated, the residual corresponding to ε i is unobservable because is unobservable. One can make the followWarn* i ing probabilistic statements about ε i after observing Warn i and Z i ␥. Given that a firm warned, ε i is likely to be high when Z i ␥ is low, thereby triggering the threshold to warn. Given that a firm did not warn, ε i is likely to be low when Z i ␥ is high, making the firm stay below the threshold. Therefore, within both the warning group and the non-warning group, high ε i is associated with low Z i ␥ and ε i varies within each group as long as Z i varies.
The three unobservables-v 1 , v 0 , and ε-are the focus of the Heckman model. The Heckman literature traditionally assumes that the choice model can be implemented by fitting data into the cumulative probability function of the standard normal distribution and that (ε, v 1 ) and (ε, v 0 ) each follow a joint-normal distribution with covariances and collapses to stand-alone regressions. Otherwise, the three equations are intertwined as follows.
Using the properties of truncated normal distributions, one can mathematically derive the expected return of a firm based on whether the firm has warned and the observables X and Z (Greene 2003, 759) . On observing a warning, investors use Equation (4) to assess stock value; for a firm that does not warn, investors use Equation (5). The last terms in Equations (4) and (5) are the ''self-selection terms,'' where (⅐) and ⌽(⅐) are the standard normal p.d.f. and c.d.f., respectively:
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Interpretation of the Self-Selection Terms Assume that managers are more likely to warn when they have more other bad news for investors and less likely to warn when they have more other good news (i.e., less other bad news). In this case, ε is higher in the presence of a larger amount of other bad news. If stock prices fully impound other bad news, then v 1 and v 0 should each be lower for firms with a larger amount of bad news and thus a higher ε. Therefore, and are negative. The negative covariances are due to the factors (unobservable to researchers) that both managers and investors consider in their respective decisions; these factors are other bad news.
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The self-selection terms in Equations (4) and (5) that the price adjustment for a warning firm is downward and that for a non-warning firm upward. Within the warning group, the amount of price adjustment decreases
with Z i ␥ and thus increases with ε i (see Appendix A). Similarly, within the non-warning group, the amount of price adjustment increases with Z i ␥ and thus decreases
with ε i . The above relations indicate that within the warning group a firm that has a larger amount of other bad news (i.e., a higher ε i ) receives a larger price cut than a firm that has less such news. Similarly, within the non-warning group a firm with a larger amount of other good news (i.e., less other bad news-a lower ε i ) receives a larger price increase than a firm with less such news. I follow the Heckman literature and label and
as the ''inverse Mills ratio'' (represented by variable Mill) for a warning firm
and a non-warning firm, respectively.
Empirical Selection Model and Its Comparison with the OLS Model
Equations (4) and (5) represent two regressions that can consistently estimate the true coefficients ␣ 1 , ␣ 0 , and ␤. I combine these two regressions to form Equation (6), which is my application of the Heckman selection model. Here, TT ϭ ␣ 1 Ϫ ␣ 0 , estimating the warning effect.
Other factors (unobservable to researchers) that either managers or investors but not both consider do not contribute to nonzero covariances and, thus, do not affect the self-selection terms.
Tucker
The Accounting Review, July 2007 In comparison, if one estimates Equations (1) and (2) in an OLS using the warning and non-warning observations, respectively, the observed coefficients-␣ 1,OLS , ␣ 0,OLS , and ␤ OLS -are potentially inconsistent estimates of the true coefficients-␣ 1 , ␣ 0 , and ␤-because of the traditional omitted-correlated-variables problem. That is, the expected value of v 1 for a warning observation is the last term in Equation (4) and the expected value of v 0 for a non-warning observation is the last term in Equation (5). The error terms v 1 and v 0 are expected to be correlated with X as long as and are not 0 and Z and X have εv εv 1 0 common variables. Even though the OLS coefficients are inconsistent for the true coefficients, we can still write Equations (7) and (8). Equation (9) combines Equations (7) and (8) in one regression, where OLS ϭ ␣ 1,OLS Ϫ ␣ 0,OLS , representing the between-group return difference after controlling for X:
1i warm ϭ1
KL estimate the between-group return difference OLS , not the warning effect TT . To see the relation between these two, I subtract both sides of Equations (5) from (4), subtract both sides of Equations (8) from (7), and then take the sample average. Both subtractions result in the same left-hand side. The right-hand side of the first subtraction is TT plus the average difference between warning firms' price adjustments for other bad news and nonwarning firms' price adjustments for other bad news-the self-selection effect (''SS''). The right-hand side of the second subtraction is OLS . Equating the right-hand sides of both subtractions, I obtain Equation (10): OLS can be decomposed into TT and SS.
8 If the OLS model rather than the selection model is used, then SS is the estimation bias in determining the warning effect:
IV. EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS I predict that warnings are not penalized by investors (i.e., TT ϭ 0) in the long run because warnings are voluntary.
9 Otherwise, managers who are presumably rational in making disclosure decisions would stop issuing warnings and the warning phenomenon should 8 See Greene (2003, 788) . Heckman (2001, 718) shows this decomposition relation in more general terms:
Adding and subtracting E(R 0 ͉ warnϭ1 ) makes this relation clear. The first bracket on the right-hand side is TT , generally called the ''treatment effect on the treated group''; the second bracket is SS. 9 Investors require higher returns from firms for which public information is lacking (Klein and Bawa 1976; Barry and Brown 1985; Easley and O'Hara 2004) . So, in theory firms that are forthright with investors receive a market reward. The reward for warnings may be too small to be empirically detected, because a warning is only one disclosure and the incremental transparency is minimal if a firm has been open in the past. Tucker (2006) finds that, relative to warnings firms, non-warning firms lose analyst coverage after failing to warn.
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These scenarios are organized around (1) whether self-selection exists and (2) whether stock prices behave as if investors process news efficiently. In Figure 2 , I summarize my predictions for the between-group return difference ( OLS ), warning effect ( TT ), and self-selection effect (SS) in the short-and long-term windows in each scenario.
Scenario A-Efficient Market and No Self-Selection
If managers do not consider non-earnings news when deciding whether to warn, then there is no issue of self-selection and therefore SS is 0 in both the short-and long-term. In the absence of SS, Equation (10) indicates that OLS should be same as TT , which is predicted to be 0 in the long run. Thus, in this scenario OLS , TT , and SS are all predicted to be 0 in the long run. If investors fully process news in the short-term, then the shortterm returns should be no different from the long-term returns, so my predictions for OLS , TT , and SS in the short-term are also 0 under Scenario A. Note that KL find a negative OLS , invalidating Scenario A. My discussion of this scenario is merely for benchmarking.
Scenario B-Inefficient Market and No Self-Selection
As proposed by KL, investors may overreact to warnings. Investors are often panicked by bad news because, as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue, the value function of a riskaverse individual is commonly convex for losses. The market may be more alarmed by warnings than by negative earnings news released by non-warning firms in earnings announcements. For a small number of firms, a warning only foreshadows what is to come, such as deteriorating operations, earnings restatements, SEC investigations, and lawsuits. For example, the warnings by Motorola on July 10, 1996; Gillette on August 14, 1997; and Hewlett-Packard on May 13, 1998 were only the beginning of a series of strategic mishaps and operational failures. The media coverage of such firms may cause investors to overestimate the proportion of troubled firms among warning firms and overreact to the act of warning.
In Scenario B, OLS is predicted to be negative in the short-term because of the overreaction. Market overreaction is inevitably corrected in the long-term, so OLS should be 0 in the long-term. Because self-selection is not an issue in this scenario, SS is 0 and TT ϭ OLS in both the short-and long-term.
Scenario C-Efficient Market and Self-Selection
Assume managers are more (less) likely to warn when they have more (less) other bad news. If stock prices fully impound such news, then the average return of warning firms should be lower than that of non-warning firms even if both groups have the same risks and earnings news-SS is negative. Because my overall prediction for TT in the long run is 0, I expect that OLS is equal to SS and is thus negative in the long run in Scenario C. In this efficient market scenario, my predictions for OLS , TT , and SS in the short-term are the same as those in the long-term.
Scenario D-Inefficient Market and Self-Selection
This scenario deviates from Scenario C in that stock prices do not fully impound other bad news in the short-term. All the predictions for the long-term in this scenario remain 
Empirical Predictions for Market Scenarios A (benchmark), B, C, and D:
In the model, R is stock return, X is the row vector of variables controlling for risks and earnings news (β is the column vector of coefficients), and Warn is 1 for warning firms and 0 for nonwarning firms. Mill is the inverse Mills ratio, defined as σ ) is the covariance of the error terms of the warning model and the regression of R on X and the constant term using warning (non-warning) observations. Scenarios A and C are self-explanatory. Scenario B allows for market overreaction to the act of warning. Scenario D allows for incomplete or directionally incorrect stock price adjustments for other bad news in the short-term. See Figure 3 for the short-term window (ST) and the long-term windows (LT).
Warning Effect Self-Selection Effect (SS)
the same as those in Scenario C. In the short-term, investors' price adjustments for other bad news may be incomplete or directionally incorrect. Next, I explain why the inefficiency may occur and then explain my predictions for OLS , TT , and SS in the short-term.
Traditional economics assumes that agents are globally rational-they are endowed with information and unlimited ability to process information. In reality, investors are perhaps bounded rational-they make optimal decisions within the constraints of information costs (Simon 1955 (Simon , 1959 March 1978) . Consequently, price discovery takes time as information is gathered and digested (Gonedes 1976; Lee 2001; O'Hara 2003) .
By the end of the short-term window, investors could infer other bad news about each firm. Since the direct impact of other bad news on future cash flows may be unclear, investors may need extra time to fully understand the implications of such news. Moreover, investors' price adjustments in the short-term window for other bad news may be incomplete or incorrect to a larger extent for non-warning firms than for warning firms for two reasons. First, non-warning firms' negative earnings surprises, given on the earnings announcement date, arrive much later than warnings. Second, investors may pay limited attention to an earnings shortfall disclosed in an earnings announcement because they are occupied with digesting other firms' earnings announcements (Simon 1978; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) .
In light of KL's finding, I predict OLS to be negative in the short-term in Scenario D. Because, as shown in Equation (10), the self-selection effect is the difference between investors' average price adjustment for warning firms and their average price
adjustment for non-warning firms SS depends on the signs and mag- prediction for TT in the short-term is equally unclear because TT is the residual effect in OLS after SS is removed.
V. VARIABLES Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in my return analysis is a firm's buy-and-hold return over various windows (Figure 3 ). The short-term return (R Short ) is measured from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter (i.e., the quarter in which an earnings shortfall occurs) to five days after the event-quarter earnings announcement date. The long-term window extends this window by 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, or 12 months (R
Long1
, R
Long2
, R Long3 , etc.) after the end of the event-quarter earnings-announcement month. I use various lengths because the speed of price adjustments is unknown. I stop at 12 months out of concern for potential measurement-error problems in long-run returns (Fama 1998, 291) .
Control Variables-Factor Returns
The finance literature has identified market risk, firm size, market-to-book (''M/B''), momentum, and industry as factors that affect cross-sectional stock returns. I use a portfolio approach to control for these effects. At the beginning of each month, I form beta deciles, 20 size groups, M/B deciles, momentum deciles, and 48 Fama and French (1997; hereafter Fama-French) industry groups using all U.S. common stocks covered by CRSP and Compustat. Beta is the coefficient on equal-weighted market returns in the market model that uses daily returns in the one-year period before that month. Size is the beginning-of-month market value of equity. M/B is the ratio of the beginning-of-month market value of equity Q represents the end of a fiscal quarter and A represents the earnings announcement date. R Short is measured from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter to five days after the eventquarter earnings announcement date. R Long1 is measured from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter to one month after the end of the event-quarter earnings announcement month. R Long3 is measured from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter to three months after the end of the event-quarter earnings announcement month. R Long12 is measured from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter to 12 months after the end of the event-quarter earnings announcement month.
over the book value of equity reported in the most recent quarter. Momentum is measured by the sum of past six-month returns.
To control for each factor, I match a sample observation with a portfolio to which the firm belongs at the beginning of the short-term window. I purge the sample firm-quarters from the benchmark portfolios (Loughran and Ritter 2000, 372 and 382) . From each benchmark portfolio, I randomly choose 100 members, calculate the buy-and-hold returns for each member over the same holding period as the dependent variable, and use the equalweighted mean as the factor return, denoted as R beta , R size , R mb , R mom , and R ind , respectively.
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Control Variables-Accounting Characteristics Previous research finds that accounting information helps investors evaluate risks (Hamada 1969; Beaver et al. 1970) . I control for three accounting metrics-leverage, accounting return on assets, and earnings volatility-so that in the tests a firm's stock return is compared with the returns of firms with similar accounting characteristics, in case these metrics capture risks. The three accounting metrics represent three aspects of a firm's business: financial structure, performance, and performance variability. Leverage is the average ratio of total liabilities over total assets in the four quarters before the event quarter. ROA is the average ratio of earnings before extraordinary items over beginning-of-quarter assets 11 Finance studies commonly control for these factors by subtracting the benchmark portfolio return (the same size, M / B, and momentum group as the sample firm) from the sample firm's return and then using the excess return as the dependent variable. When the number of factors is large, this approach yields a benchmark portfolio with a small number of firms. For example, if I first sort all the public companies (about 10,000) into five size groups, then five M / B groups for each size group, and finally three momentum groups for each M / B group, I only have 133 firms available for further sorting into 10 beta and 48 industry groups.
The Accounting Review, July 2007 in the four quarters before the event quarter. EarnVolt is the standard deviation of accounting return on assets in the eight quarters before the event quarter.
Control Variables-Earnings Innovations
I use two variables to capture the change in stock prices due to news. The first variable is the event-quarter earnings surprise (Surprise) measured as the difference between the forthcoming earnings per share (''EPS'') and analyst consensus (both from I/B/E/S). For warning firms, the consensus is the most recent one compiled before the warning; for non-warning firms, the consensus is the last one before the beginning of the short-term window.
The second variable is future earnings change (FutureEPS). I control for FutureEPS in the short-term window because stock price leads earnings: a portion of current price change is due to information about future earnings before they are recognized in accounting books (Beaver et al. 1980) . I control for FutureEPS in the long-term window because stock prices after the event quarter are affected by the portion of future earnings change that investors do not anticipate in the event quarter (Elton 1999 (Elton , 1214 . I measure FutureEPS as the change in average diluted EPS (before extraordinary items) from the four quarters before the event to the four quarters after the event. As with KL, I deflate both earnings variables by the split-adjusted stock price at the beginning of the event quarter.
Control Variable-Mill
I identify observable variables that capture managers' litigation-, reputation-, and earnings-torpedo-related motives for issuing warnings. For the litigation-related motive, I include (1) general litigation risk (LitigRisk), (2) expected legal settlement costs (LogMVE and LogSurprise), and (3) specific litigation risk from a firm's failure to update a previously issued projection for the event quarter (Forecast).
LitigRisk is the probability of being sued (see Appendix B). Because of skewness I use the fractional rankings of this probability in the full sample for the empirical tests. Expected legal costs are higher for larger firms and firms with a larger magnitude of earnings shortfall. The two components arguably have a multiplicative relation (Skinner 1997) , so I include the log transformations of both components. LogMVE is the log transformation of market value of equity at the beginning of the event quarter. LogSurprise is the log transformation of the absolute value of Surprise.
If a firm has issued an earnings forecast about the event quarter, then managers may be concerned about potential lawsuits from failing to update or correct the previous projection.
12 Because this situation presents a specific litigation risk for managers, I include a dummy variable Forecast to capture this risk. The variable is 1 if a firm issues a forecast about the event quarter before the third fiscal month, and 0 otherwise.
For the reputation-related motive, I use past disclosure frequency (PastDisclosure) and analyst following (PastFollow). PastDisclosure is the number of positive or negative guidelines about quarterly earnings issued by a firm in the 360 days before it announces earnings for the quarter before the event quarter. If First Call does not have records for a firm in this period, then the prior disclosure level is considered 0. PastFollow is the average number of analysts whose forecasts are included in the most recent consensus compiled before earnings announcements for the four quarters before the event. As with Frankel and Li (2004) , analyst coverage is considered 0 if a firm is not covered by I/B/E/S. I convert PastDisclosure and PastFollow each into fractional rankings among all firms in the event quarter that are covered by Compustat, CRSP, and I/B/E/S. This conversion controls for potential time trends in First Call, media, and analyst coverage as well as fluctuations in firms' disclosures due to market conditions or the legal environment.
To capture the motive of growth firms for softening the earnings-torpedo effect, I use M/B (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Anilowski et al. 2006 ). Finally, I control for earnings volatility because managers with more volatile earnings may feel less need to warn investors of an earnings fluctuation. In sum, Equation (11) implements the warning model (3). The explanatory variables in Equation (11) constitute the elements of Z in Equation (3):
After estimating Equation (11), I calculate Mill as and for a warning
and a non-warning firm, respectively (see Section III). Mill is then included in the return regression to control for self-selection. Equation (12) implements the selection model (6): 13 This period starts with 1996 because the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 expanded the safe-harbor protection to firms for issuing forward-looking information, raised the bar for class action lawsuits, and thus changed firms' legal and information environment. Table 1 summarizes the collection of my warning events. During the sample period, U.S. companies issued 8,692 negative guidelines about quarterly earnings.
14 In addition to 13 ''Quarter'' is calendarized. A firm's fiscal quarter is relabeled to the calendar quarter with which it overlaps most. This procedure improves the control for time effect because only about 67 percent of the firms covered by Compustat end their fiscal years on December 31 and the next most popular fiscal-year-end is June 30. 14 First Call collects company disclosures from press releases and interviews, compares them with existing market expectations, and codes them as positive, negative, or in-line guidance. To check First Call's positive / negative classification accuracy, I searched the Factiva news database for 100 events randomly chosen from the First Call 2004 data. I found confirmation in the news for 87 events. Among the 13 unconfirmed events, I could not find guidance news for 7 events; for the remaining 6 events I found news that contradicted First Call's classification. The misclassified events are likely excluded from the sample when I delete the events with earnings surprises higher than Ϫ0.001 in the data procedures.
The Accounting Review, July 2007 ''A warning its fourth-quarter earnings will come in below analysts' expectations sent shares of Molecular Dynamics Inc. down 38% Friday. The near-term uncertainty of the company's Japan business because of financial turmoil in Asia is also a factor, it said. Molecular Dynamics expects its fourth quarter to come in under analysts' forecasts, and down sequentially from earnings of $1.4 million, or 12 cents a share, in the third quarter. A survey of four analysts polled by First Call projected a mean estimate of 14 cents a share for the fourth quarter ...'' (Dow Jones Online News, ''Molecular Dynamics's shares plunge 38% on lower earnings forecast,'' 1/9/1998) events excluded due to missing data, I exclude 3,214 negative guidelines issued before the third fiscal month of a quarter because my study focuses on warnings, not forecasts. I also exclude 469 events of extremely small news, defined as the event-quarter earnings surprise higher than Ϫ0.001. Among these events 222 are small negative earnings surprises; they are excluded because managers may be unaware of such a small shortfall. The remaining events are positive earnings surprises according to I/B/E/S even though CIG classifies these events as negative earnings guidelines. To avoid spurious results by penny stocks, which are extremely illiquid and for which market arbitrage is weak (D'Avolio 2002), I delete 24 events whose beginning-of-event-quarter stock price is less than $2. The final number of warnings is 3,869.
Tucker The Accounting Review, July 2007
The non-warning observations are the firm quarters in which the forthcoming earnings are lower than analyst consensus before the third fiscal month but the firms do not warn. If, according to First Call, a firm issues negative guidance about sales, cash flows, earnings growth, or EBITDA, then this firm quarter is excluded from the non-warning group. I then follow the same procedures used for warning events to exclude extremely small news, penny stocks, and the observations that have insufficient data. These procedures result in 23,158 non-warning observations. Table 2 describes the warning and non-warning groups. Warnings are issued by almost all 48 Fama-French industries. Business services, retail, chips, computer, and machinery industries have the highest number of warnings (Panel A).
Descriptive Statistics
To compare with prior research, in Table 2 , Panel B I report the sum of daily marketadjusted returns in the warning and earnings-announcement event windows as well as in the short-term window. Warning firms experience a mean return of Ϫ13.2 percent during the three trading days around warning but the return around earnings announcement is close to 0, suggesting that warning is a timing issue rather than an issue of piecemeal disclosure. For those that have waited to release bad news until earnings announcement, the average three-trading-day return is Ϫ2.1 percent. On the other hand, warning and non-warning firms experience a mean return of Ϫ19.5 percent and Ϫ8.4 percent in the short-term window, respectively. These returns are more negative than the three-day event window returns, probably because of intra-industry information transfer (i.e., a price decline upon peers' warnings) and the arrival of other bad news.
Panel C of Table 2 describes the main variables used in the empirical tests. Warning firms have lower buy-and-hold returns, worse event-quarter earnings news (median), and larger declines in future earnings than non-warning firms. As Barber and Lyon (1997) note, returns tend to be positively skewed when the window is long (e.g., R Long12 ). Panel D reports the pairwise correlations of the main variables. As predicted, realized returns are positively correlated with both the event-quarter earnings surprise and the change in future earnings.
Panel E of Table 2 presents the correlations between firms' buy-and-hold returns and the factor returns. For brevity, I only report the three-month extension window; the correlations for other windows are similar. The correlation between realized returns and industry factor return is the highest among all correlations involving realized returns; beta factor return comes next. The correlations between the factor returns themselves range from 0.654 to 0.789, yet, according to my variance-inflation-factor analysis (unreported), multicollinearity is not a concern in the multivariate tests.
VII. RESULTS
In this section I first report the warning model estimation. I next present the test results in the short-and long-term windows when self-selection is not controlled for. I then report my primary test results-the tests when self-selection is controlled for. I briefly note the robustness tests concerning subsamples and model specifications. Finally, I examine postevent returns and evaluate trading strategies to provide supplementary evidence for the primary results. Figure 4 summarizes the key results. Fama and French (1997) . See Table 1 for the identification of warning observations. Non-warning observations are the firm quarters for which the forthcoming earnings are less than the most recent analyst consensus before the third fiscal month but the firms do not warn. b The returns are the sum of daily market-adjusted return for each group. The short-term window runs from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter to five days after the event-quarter earnings announcement date. The three-trading day is [-1, 1], where 0 is the event day. c All the correlations are statistically significant at 1 percent in a two-tailed test. The Spearman correlations are similar and are thus not reported. Variable Definitions for Panels C and D: R Short ϭ a firm's buy-and-hold return from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter to five days after the event-quarter earnings announcement date; R Long1 , R
Long3
, and R Long12 ϭ a firm's buy-and-hold return from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter to one, three, and 12 months after the end of the event-quarter earnings announcement month, respectively; Beta ϭ the coefficient on equal-weighted market returns in a market model using daily returns in the one-year period before the event quarter; MVE ϭ the market value of equity at the beginning of the event quarter (in millions); M / B ϭ the market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the event quarter; Leverage ϭ the average debt-to-assets ratio in the four quarters before the event quarter;
ROA ϭ the average accounting return on assets in the four quarters before the event quarter; EarnVolt ϭ the standard deviation of accounting return on assets in the eight quarters before the event quarter; FutureEPS ϭ the change in average diluted EPS (before extraordinary items) from the four pre-to the four post-event quarters, deflated by the split-adjusted stock price at the beginning of the event quarter; and For a warning observation, Surprise ϭ the difference between the forthcoming EPS and the most recent analyst consensus before the warning (both earnings are from I / B / E / S). For a non-warning observation, Surprise is the difference between the forthcoming EPS and the last analyst consensus before the third fiscal month of the event quarter. Earnings surprise is deflated by the split-adjusted beginning-of-event-quarter stock price. All variables except for MVE are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent in the full sample.
(continued on next page)
The Accounting Review, July 2007 Fama and French (1997) industry groups. Beta is estimated in a market model using daily returns in the one-year period before that month, size is the market value of equity at the beginning of the month, M / B is the ratio of the market value of equity at the beginning of the month over the book value of equity reported in the most recent quarter, and the momentum factor uses the sum of past six-month stock returns. For each warning and non-warning observation, I determine its benchmark portfolio affiliation at the beginning of the third fiscal month. I purge all warning and non-warning observations from the benchmark portfolio, randomly choose 100 members from each portfolio, calculate the buy-and-hold returns for each member over the same holding period as the dependent variable, and use the equal-weighted mean as the factor return. Table 3 reports the estimation results. As predicted, firms are more likely to warn if they are riskier, larger, have a larger earning shortfall, issued a forecast for the event quarter early on, gave more disclosures, or had higher analyst following in the past quarters. Firms with more volatile earnings are less likely to warn. The pseudo R 2 is 9.15 percent.
Warning Model Estimation
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Return Tests without Control for Self-Selection I first estimate KL's short-term return regression (Table 4 , Panel A). The coefficient on Warn is significantly negative, consistent with KL and contradicting Market Scenario A. The earnings response coefficient is significantly positive at 0.944, whereas KL, Shu (2003) , and Xu (2003) all report insignificant coefficients, probably because of their small samples.
Panel B of Table 4 reports my return regression without control for self-selection. The coefficient on Warn, OLS , is not only significantly negative, but is also surprisingly close to Ϫ10 percent across all the windows (including the six-, nine-, and 12-month extensions, unreported). Specifically, OLS is Ϫ10.1 percent for the short-term window and Ϫ9.8 percent for the three-month-extension window. The fact that OLS does not change as the window is extended suggests that investors have initially correctly valued the warning group relative to the non-warning group. The negative OLS in both the short-and long-term invalidates Scenario B.
Return Tests with Control for Self-Selection
Panel C of Table 4 reports my return regression when I add the control for selfselection. The t-statistics are robust to heteroscedasticity (Huber/White/Sandwich standard error estimator). In Panel D of Table 4 , I present two alternative estimations that additionally allow for cross-sectional error correlations. Below, I draw inferences from Panel C rather than Panel D because the latter uses only 30 quarterly cross-sections and, as a result of low power, the tests may bias toward finding no warning effect in the long run-my main prediction. # Indicates statistical insignificance at 10 percent in a two-tailed test. Short Term is the short-term window running from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter to five days after the event-quarter earnings announcement date. Long Term is the long-term window running from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter to three months after the end of the event-quarter earnings announcement month. Post Event is the post-event window that begins on the sixth day after the event-quarter earnings announcement date and ends three months after the end of the event-quarter earnings announcement month. The short-and long-term test results are reported in Table 4 Panel C of Table 4 shows that the coefficient on Warn, TT , is significantly negative in the short-term (coefficient ϭ Ϫ6.4 percent, t-statistic ϭ Ϫ4.21). The negative TT indicates that warning firms earn lower returns in the short-term than those that have similar risks, earnings news, and non-earnings news but do not warn. That is, the market penalizes the act of warning in the short-term. However, the penalty diminishes as the window is extended and it disappears for the two-and three-month extensions (also for the six-, nine-, and 12-month extensions, unreported).
Using the decomposition in Equation (10), I estimate the self-selection effect (SS) to be Ϫ3.7 percent for the short-term window and Ϫ10.5 percent for the three-month extension. The negative SS indicates that, on average, warning firms have a larger amount of other bad news than non-warning firms. The patterns of OLS , TT , and SS suggest that, in the short-term, the lower returns of warning firms relative to non-warning firms are due to both a negative warning effect and a negative self-selection effect. However, in the long run they are due purely to self-selection. The evidence is consistent with Scenario D, not with Scenario C.
To gain insight into why a warning penalty exists in the short-term, I further examine the components of the self-selection effect and their changes from the short to long-term. Panel C of Table 4 reports the coefficients on Mill for the warning and non-warning groups, respectively. Recall that the coefficient on warning firms' Mill is the estimate of -the εv1 covariance of the error terms of return regression (1) and warning model (3). Similarly, the coefficient on non-warning firms' Mill is the estimate of -the covariance of the error Warn ϭ 1 for the warning group and 0 for the non-warning group; LitigRisk ϭ the full-sample rankings (0 for the lowest and 1 for the highest) of the likelihood of being sued (Appendix B), estimated with the input variables measured in the one-year period before the event quarter; LogMVE ϭ the log transformation of market value of equity at the beginning of the event quarter (in millions); LogSurprise ϭ the log transformation of the absolute value of event-quarter earnings surprise; for a warning observation, earnings surprise is the difference between the forthcoming EPS and the most recent analyst consensus before the warning (both from I / B / E / S); for a non-warning observation, it is the difference between the forthcoming EPS and the last analyst consensus before the third fiscal month of the event quarter. Earnings surprise is deflated by the splitadjusted beginning-of-quarter stock price; Forecast ϭ 1 if a firm has issued earnings forecast about the event quarter before the third fiscal month, and 0 otherwise; PastDisclosure ϭ the number of positive or negative guidelines about quarterly earnings issued by a firm in the 360 days before the event quarter; PastFollow ϭ the average number of analysts whose earnings forecasts are included in the most recent consensus before earnings announcement for the four quarters before the event quarter; each of the above two measures is converted into rankings (between 0 and 1) among all firms in the event quarter that are covered by Compustat, CRSP, and I / B / E / S; M / B ϭ the market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the event quarter; and EarnVolt ϭ the standard deviation of accounting return on assets in the eight quarters before the event quarter; the above two measures are each winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent.
when they have more (less) other bad news and stock prices fully impound such news, then both covariances should be negative. Panel C shows that they are indeed negative in the long run, but they change from the short to long-term, suggesting within-group mispricing. Specifically, although is significantly negative in both the short-term (Ϫ0.034) and εv1 the three-month extension window (Ϫ0.067), its magnitude in the short-term is only half of that in the long-term. This finding suggests that the positions that investors initially take to adjust warning firms' prices for other bad news are correct but the adjustments are inadequate. For the non-warning group, is significantly negative in the three-month ***, **, * Indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent in a two-tailed test, respectively. The t-statistics are in the parentheses. In Panels B and C, the t-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Huber / White / Sandwich standard error estimator). a CAR is the sum of daily market-adjusted return from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter to five days after the event-quarter earnings announcement date. Surprise is the earnings surprise, deflated by the beginning-of-quarter stock price. LogMVE is the log transformation of market value of equity at the beginning of the event quarter (in millions). b The estimation takes two steps. In the first step I estimate the probit warning model and calculate Mill. In the second step I add Mill to the return regression and estimate the regression allowing for heteroscedasticity (Huber / White / Sandwich estimator). In the second step the statistical package does not correct the variance for the sampling error from the first step. I compare the test results of a typical treatment-effect regression, for which the statistical package makes the variance correction, with those without variance correction and find little difference. c The robust standard error estimation allows for heteroscedasticity and within-year-quarter error-term correlations (the ''reg'' procedure in Stata with the ''cluster'' option). The Fama-MacBeth estimation uses the time-series of coefficient estimates from 30 quarterly cross sections and the mean coefficient estimates and R 2 are reported. Variable Definitions:
Warn ϭ 1 for a warning observation (3,869) and 0 for a non-warning observation (23,158); R Short ϭ a firm's buy-and-hold return from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter to five days after the event-quarter earnings announcement date; R Long1 , R
Long2
, and R Long3 ϭ a firm's buy-and-hold return from the beginning of the third fiscal month of the event quarter to one, two, and three months after the end of the event-quarter earnings announcement month, respectively; For each warning and non-warning observation,
, and R ind ϭ the buy-and-hold return of a portfolio of firms in the same beta group (10), firm-size group (20), M / B group (10), return momentum group (10), and Fama-French industry group (48) as the sample firm at the beginning of the third fiscal month, respectively. At the beginning of each month, beta is estimated in a market model using daily returns over the one-year period before that month, size is the market value of equity at the beginning of the month, M / B is the ratio of the market value of equity at the beginning of the month over the book value of equity reported in the most recent quarter, and the momentum factor uses the sum of past six-month stock returns. I purge all warning and non-warning observations from the benchmark portfolio, randomly choose 100 members from each portfolio, calculate the buy-and-hold returns for each member over the same holding period as the dependent variable, and use the equal-weighted mean as the factor return; Leverage ϭ the average debts-to-assets ratio in the four quarters before the event quarter;
ROA ϭ the average accounting return on assets in the four quarters before the event quarter; EarnVolt ϭ the standard deviation of accounting return on assets in the eight quarters before the event quarter;
(continued on next page)
TABLE 4 (continued)
For a warning observation, Surprise ϭ the difference between the forthcoming EPS and the most recent analyst consensus before the warning (both from I / B / E / S). For a non-warning observation, it is the difference between the forthcoming EPS and the last analyst consensus before the third fiscal month of the event quarter. Surprise is deflated by the split-adjusted beginning-of-event-quarter stock price; FutureEPS ϭ the change in average diluted EPS (before extraordinary items) from the four pre-to the four postevent quarters, deflated by the split-adjusted beginning-of-event-quarter price; and
Mill ϭ the inverse Mills ratio, defined as for a warning firm and for a non-warning
firm, where and ⌽ are standard normal p.d.f. and c.d.f., respectively, Z is the row vector of explanatory variables in the warning choice model, and ␥ is the column vector of coefficients estimated in Table 3 . All continuous variables except for Mill and LogMVE are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. extension window (Ϫ0.039), but is significantly positive in the short-term (0.049). The reversal suggests that investors initially make a mistake. In sum, investors are supposed to adjust prices downward for firms with more other bad news relative to those with less both within the warning group and within the non-warning group. However, such adjustments do not occur to the non-warning group in the short-term (and the degree of adjustments within the warning group is inadequate). Consequently, a firm with a large amount of other bad news, which therefore tends to warn, is worse off in the short-term for having warned than for being silent.
In unreported tests I partition the sample by Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) and by the magnitude of earnings surprise. Before FD, some firms might have warned privately but are misclassified into the non-warning group. After FD, managers' private communication channels are legally suppressed, so the potential classification problem is mitigated. I find that the post-FD warning model indeed has a higher pseudo R 2 (16.6 percent) than that from the full sample and that my primary results largely hold in both subperiods.
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Alternatively, I use 1 percent price-deflated earnings surprise as the cutoff to partition the sample into small-and large-surprise subsamples. My primary results hold in both subsamples.
My use of the selection model has a caveat: The results may be sensitive to the specification of Z because Z i ␥ determines the magnitude of price adjustments for other bad news. Simply put, the model uses Z i ␥ that are observable to infer other bad news that is unobservable. The more we know about Z i ␥, the better inferences we can make about other bad news. For example, if the warning model is weak, the self-selection terms would act like noise such that SS is 0 and TT ϭ OLS . My evidence of significant SS alleviates this concern. Although I use the best warning model based on extant evidence, my study may be sensitive to including new warning factors identified from future theories.
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17 Before FD, OLS , TT , and SS are Ϫ0.134, Ϫ0.116, and Ϫ0.018 for the short-term window and Ϫ0.125, 0.011, and Ϫ0.136 for the three-month extension window, respectively. After FD, OLS , TT , and SS are Ϫ0.054, Ϫ0.030, and Ϫ0.024 for the short-term window and Ϫ0.063, 0.012, and Ϫ0.075 for the three-month extension window, respectively. Both the between-group return difference and the short-term warning effect are smaller after FD than before FD perhaps because of firms' higher tendency to warn after FD than before FD (Figure 1 ). 18 I check how the results are sensitive to the inclusion of already identified warning factors. When the warning model includes only litigation risk, firm size, and earnings surprise, the pseudo R 2 is 4.4 percent and the warning effect is significantly negative even in the long run. After Forecast is added, the pseudo R 2 is improved to 6.1 percent and the warning effect is qualitatively similar to my primary results. The warning effect is insensitive to further adding the remaining identified warning factors. My primary results are also insensitive to (1) adding FutureEPS to the warning model, (2) excluding FutureEPS, Leverage, ROA, and Earnvolt from the return regression, and (3) measuring FutureEPS in the eight rather than four quarters after the event quarter.
Supplementary Tests-Post-Event Returns
I examine post-event returns to corroborate the primary results. The post-event windows start on the sixth day following the event-quarter earnings announcement and end at various points as the long-term windows end. Panel A of Table 5 shows that the post-event warning effect is significantly positive. The positive warning effect in the post-event windows following the negative warning effect in the short-term window explains why the overall warning effect in the long-term window is nil. In addition, the estimate of is signifiεv0 cantly negative, consistent with its reversal from being positive in the short-term to being negative in the long-term, suggesting a correction of short-term mispricing within the nonwarning group. The estimate of is significantly negative in the three-month post-event εv1 window, suggesting that three months after the event quarter investors have better understanding of warning firms' other bad news, even though their initial positions are directionally correct.
In the second-to-last row, I exclude the self-selection terms and report the coefficient on Warn. This coefficient is about 0, indicating no return reversal nor drift after the event quarter. In the last row, I re-estimate the coefficient on Warn after further excluding FutureEPS. Because all the variables are publicly known at the beginning of the return window, this coefficient essentially estimates the abnormal return from a zero-investment trading strategy of longing warning stocks and shorting non-warning stocks after the event quarter. The coefficient is close to 0, indicating that the strategy based solely on the dichotomy of warning versus non-warning is not profitable, confirming that between-group mispricing does not exist. 19 Further, I form trading strategies to exploit within-group mispricing. I sort warning firms and non-warning firms separately into three groups (high, medium, and low) by the predicted warning probability (P). Note that P is low when Z i ␥ is low. Recall that within the warning group and within the non-warning group, low Z i ␥ is associated with high ε i , so low P is associated with a large amount of other bad news and vice versa. If investors initially do not understand this relation, then an arbitrage strategy of selling the warning firms with low P and buying the warning firms with high P after the event quarter is profitable. A similar strategy is applicable to the non-warning group.
Panel B of Table 5 shows, by subtracting Low P returns from High P, that this strategy earns a mean (median) abnormal return of 2.3 (2.5) percent from the warning group and 2.0 (1.6) percent from the non-warning group. The profit from the warning group is weakly significantly positive (t ϭ 1.69; Wilcoxon Z ϭ 1.65). The profit from the non-warning group is significantly positive (t ϭ 3.28; Wilcoxon Z ϭ 3.32). These results support my finding in the primary tests that mispricing exists within the warning group and within the non-warning group. When transaction costs are considered, however, these trading strategies probably yield no net profit (Korajczyk and Sadka 2004) . Thus, the evidence of these abnormal returns may not be inconsistent with market efficiency. , R Post2 , and R Post3 are a firm's buy-and-hold return from the sixth day after the event-quarter earnings announcement date to one, two, and three months after the end of the event-quarter earnings announcement month, respectively. The three new variables are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent in the full sample. See Table 4 for other variable definitions. 4. OLS is the least squares coefficient on Warn when Mill is excluded. The t-statistic is robust to heteroscedasticity. 5. OLS (excluding FutureEPS) is the least squares coefficient on Warn when Mill and FutureEPS are excluded. The t-statistic is robust to heteroscedasticity. b Notes to Panel B: 1. P is the out-of-sample warning probability. Before each quarter between 1998Q1 and 2003Q2, I estimate the warning model using all available warning and non-warning observations prior to the quarter and determine the cutoffs for three warning probability subgroups (high, medium, and low) each within the warning and non-warning groups. I then calculate the out-of-sample warning probability for firms in the current quarter and use the above cutoffs to assign these firms to high, medium, or low P groups. To avoid a look-ahead bias, the warning model estimations use unranked variables. The uneven number of firms in ''High P'' and ''Low P'' groups is due to out-of-sample predictions in 22 quarters as well as upward trends in unranked interesting findings. Warning firms have, on average, a larger amount of other bad news than non-warning firms. Investors initially do not fully infer and digest other bad news so that the price adjustments for such news in the short-term are incomplete within the warning group and directionally incorrect within the non-warning group. As a result, firms with a large amount of bad news, which therefore tend to warn, are worse off in the short-term for having warned than for being silent. The warning penalty, however, disappears when the short-term window is extended by three months. The evidence suggests that openness is ultimately not penalized by investors.
VIII. CONCLUSION
My study reinterprets Kasznik and Lev's (1995) finding and provides current, relevant evidence that should alleviate managers' concerns about a market penalty for openness. Moreover, my study demonstrates the importance of controlling for self-selection: Without such a control, one would conclude that openness is penalized when in fact it is not. A self-selection bias occurs when some factors (e.g., other bad news), unobservable to researchers, affect the choice decisions of one group (e.g., managers) and the subsequent decisions of another group (e.g., investors). This situation is fairly common in accounting and financial research, such as valuation of firms that choose to expense stock options, cut dividends, or issue new equity. Spurious relations may be drawn if self-selection is not controlled for. 
(x) ⌽(x)
The mean of the truncated distribution is smaller than the truncation point x: E(w͉w Ͻ x) Ͻ x. Therefore:
Take the derivative of with respect to x and use (A1a) in the last step: .
The mean of the truncated distribution is greater than the truncation point x: E(w͉w Ͼ x) Ͼ x. Therefore:
Take the derivative of with respect to x and use (A2a) in the last step: 
APPENDIX B LITIGATION RISK ESTIMATION
LitigRisk in Equation (11) is the predicted probability of a firm being sued using a litigation model out-of-sample with the input variables measured in the one-year period before the event quarter. The litigation model that I use is similar to those used by Rogers and Stocken (2005) and Johnson et al. (2001) . My model estimation uses class action filing data (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) obtained from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website. The dependent variable Lawsuit is 1 for any firm year in which the firm is a defendant in a class action lawsuit filed in that year, and 0 otherwise.
The explanatory variables include firm size, stock turnover, market beta, cumulative stock return, return volatility, and minimum return. For a litigated firm year, the variables are measured in the one-year period before the filing date; for a nonlitigated firm year they are measured over the calendar year. Size is the log transformation of average daily market value of equity (in millions of dollars). Turnover is the average daily trading volume deflated by the number of shares outstanding. Beta is the coefficient on market returns in the market model. CumRet is the sum of daily raw returns. StdRet is the standard deviation of daily raw returns. MinRet is the minimum daily raw return. Firm size, stock turnover, beta, and return volatility are predicted to be positively associated with litigation risk. Cumulative stock return and minimum return are predicted to be negatively associated with litigation risk.
I include three dummy variables for high-tech industries because prior research finds that high-tech firms are more likely to be sued. BusinessService is 1 if a firm is a member of Fama-French Industry Group 35, and 0 otherwise. Computer is 1 if a firm is a member of Fama-French Industry Group 36, and 0 otherwise. Chip is 1 if a firm is a member of Fama-French Industry Group 37, and 0 otherwise: 
